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THE STRAIGHT AND NARROW PATH
Gerald T. .Dunne*
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW.
By John Hart Ely. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
1980. Pp. viii, 268. Cloth $15; paper $6.95.

Unfortunately, people who try to have it both ways wind up frequently having it no way at all. There is a corollary: the centerline
is the most dangerous spot on the highway. The latter consequence
was duly noted by the Irish satirist, Honor Tracy, as an epigraph to
her Straight and Narrow Path: ''What we have to do, my dear brethren, is stay on the straight and narrow path between right and
wrong." 1
Professor Ely, whom another Irishman, Jimmy Breslin, might describe as a mighty smooth article when it comes to words, seems to
have ignored the injunction in his pioneering effort to suggest a fresh
theory of judicial review. Ely divides perceptions of that phenomenon into interpretivism and noninterpretivism, terms that are
misleading and inadequate. Noninterpretivism is a solecism par exce//ance. Save in the sense of the Moliere character who was surprised at speaking prose, how can anyone be a noninterpretivist of
anything? The chasm is not terminological but historical. It separates those who cast the federal judicial function in terms of fidelity
to the original understanding and the received text from those who
think that the Coustitution has given the federal courts what
amounts to a roving commission to go forth and do good. Justice
Harlan's ironic comment in Reynolds v. Sims "that every major social ill in this country can find its cure in some constitutional 'principle,' and that [the Supreme] Court should 'take the lead in
promoting reform' when other branches of government fail to act" 2
well captures the spirit of the "roving commission" approach.
Two better terms for the opposing sides of the faultline through
American constitutional history - variously tagged as strict and liberal construction, judicial activism and restraint, and (mutatis mutandis) positivism and natural law-would be glossators and gnostics.
The first group would take its name from the great school at
• Professor of Law, St. Louis University School of Law. B.S.B.A. 1943, Georgetown University; LL.B. 1948, St. Louis University. - Ed.
1. H. TRACY, THE STRAIGHT AND NARROW PATH 2 (1956).
2. 377 U.S. 533, 624 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Bourges3 and at least presumes the existence of a text possessing nuclear meaning and for which contemporary glosses can be found.
For the second category only "gnostic" will suffice, for it presupposes
an infused knowledge derived from insightful faith alone. (Indeed,
constitutionally, "illuminati" even though not alliterative might do
even better.) Words aside, the verbal division overlays a political
controversy, and a simple one: Does the Supreme Court of the
United States sit as a judicial tribunal under article III of the Constitution or as a plenary constitutional convention under article V?
These binary possibilities seem to be reciprocally exclusive, but
Professor Ely proposes a via media - that the Court should function
as a convention and enlarge its own powers only to ensure opportunity and not result. In sum, it should operate as a referee, indifferent
to winners and concerned only with fair play. The theory is persuasively and appealingly presented, the author proposing (indeed proving) that any debate on interpretivism versus noninterpretivism is
something of an intellectual suicide pact with rebuttals on both sides
far more devastating than positive arguments. Those, for example,
who perceive the Constitution as once and for all delivered to the
saints to be interpreted to the letter, even if the heavens fall, contend
with Chief Justice Taney's .Dred Scott opinion as a paradigm of inadequacy. Still more devastating to the gnostic cause and its inevitable presumption and moral superiority is a gagline from one of Peter
Arno's New Yorker cartoons. The drawing shows a formally clad
society couple on an emergency subway ride and lampoons their patronizing view of their fellow passengers: When the, couple asks,
"Who are these people?," one immediately thinks of the retort implicit in the title of Louis Lusky's angry anti-gnostic polemic, By
What Authority.4 And on the other side of the controversy stands
Hugo Black's unanswerable question of why the framers even bothered to give us a written Constitution at all.
Undeterred by these hazards, duly noted, Professor Ely in five
tightly and delightfully written chapters states the case for confining
judicial review to the tautology of procedural due process and avoiding the catachresis of the "substantive" variety. Here, doing justice
at retail by ensuring fair settlement of private disputes imperceptibly
blends into the larger task of doing it at wholesale by ensuring open
communication and fair representation so that the democratic process may work its will. En route, Ely pauses at some fascinating way
stations with engaging and provocative reflections on equal protection and the imposition of values. The one-liners are delicious. One
jewel is the deadpan putdown of the straightforward requirement
that the President be a natural-born citizen ("conceivably if improb3. See T. PLUCKNETI, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 296 (1956).
4. L. LUSKY, BY WHAT AUTHORITY (1975).
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ably here, a requirement of legitimacy (or illegitimacy!) or non-Caesarian birth") (p. 13). Another should exorcise conservative
suspicion that the author is a liberal manque: "The Constitution
may follow the flag, but is it really supposed to keep up with the New
York Review of Books?" (p. 58).
To be sure, a spoonful of sugar makes the medicine go down, but
some readers have swallowed hard. Archibald Cox, alarmed over a
possible overthrow of Roe v. Wade, 5 is apprehensive whether Ely's
formula can reach a like result. 6 Another reviewer, interpretivist
guns blazing to the last, suggests that traditionalists have given up
much too quickly on the historic specificity of privileges and immunities.7 Indeed there is no doubt that nonamendatory interpretivism
is a stabilizing and conserving doctrine: "Maybe at bottom I'm a
conservative," once observed Justice Black. "I couldn't add to a bill
of rights." 8
There are other irritants in the book. The suggestion for a suffocating judicial oversight of the legislative process may only exacerbate the majoritarian backlash that the work was presumably written
to impede. Moreover, the comment on reverse discrimination ("I
have trouble understanding the place of righteous indignation on either side of this wrenching moral issue") (p. 170) may well be read
by many as the infuriating elitist insouciance of a tenured Harvard
professor.
Indeed, sooner or later this suspect attitude may prompt a reviewer for the National Review (or perhaps the Oral Roberts or Bob
Jones Law Journal) to pounce and proclaim the Ely formulation a
two-steps forward, one-step backward liberal ploy to defuse the ku!turkam_pf that judicial activism has unleashed and that currently
finds expression in one-issue politics, withdrawal proposals, and suggested constitutional amendments. The commentators might well insist that the cat is out of the bag thanks to Archibald Cox's published
anxieties on the future of Roe v. Wade under process-bound judicial
review, accompanied as it is by Aesopian suggestions on how Ely's
ideas could be reformulated to produce an unchanged result. 9
If Cox's essentially critical reception of the book augurs dissatisfaction from the liberal left, literalists of the right are not without
their own concerns. As noted, one reviewer suggests that resort to
the historical linguistics, not to a new view of equal protection and
fair representation, suffices to resolve the tension between majority
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. Cox, Book Review, 94 HARV. L. REV. 700, 710 (1981).
7. Conant, Book Review, 34 VAND. L. REV. 233 (1981).
8. D. Berman, Transcript of Conversation with Justice Black (Mar. 22, 1956) (Berman
Papers, Berman Residence, Chevy Chase, Md.).
9. Cox,supra note 6, at 710-11.
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rule and minority rights, and does so without the extraconstitutional
excursions that Ely would license. 10 On this side of the spectrum
persist the historic reservations about judicial review itself, an institution that minds as acute as those of Learned Hand and Hugo
Black have found without explicit warrant in the constitutional text
and justified only by necessity.u
Since necessity knows no law, constitutional or otherwise, the
centerline becomes a dangerous place. Perhaps by way of consequence, few reviewers announce their conversion to the Ely thesis,
and at least one judge has seen the proposal as proof positive of the
Supreme Court's elitist distrust of popular democracy. 12 The reasons are not hard to find. As Honor Tracy's Irish sermon suggested,
half way between good and evil is still evil. For those who perceive
judicial review as a monstrous fraud without warrant either in the
original understanding or the received text (to borrow Justice
Holmes's characterization of a judicial putsch), it is also beyond legitimation by any lapse oftime or array of authority, even John Hart
Ely's, and a little of it is as bad as a lot. And, similarly, those who
cannot control the political process but who are riding high under
raw judicial power will be reluctant to yield any area of it.
But beyond the circumstance of Ely contra mundum, there is another reason why the thesis fails. The American constitutional experiment is shot through with tension and contradiction.
Federalism, separation of powers, and majority rule versus minority
right may well constitute its vital essence. One does not let sunlight
in on mysteries, warned the eminent Victorian, Walter Bagehot, and
Holmes contemporaneously cautioned that where distinctions are vital rather than formal, the problems should be existentially endured
rather than rationally reconciled.

10. Conant, supra note 7.
11. See, e.g., L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 15 (1958); Cooper, Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black:
Footnotes lo a Great Case, 24 ALA. L. REv. 1, 5 (1971).
12. See Wengler v. Druggists Ins. Co., 601 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Mo. 1981) (Donnelly, J.,
concurring).

